Review Essays:  Bringing Domestic Politics Back into Grand Strategy,   Is the American Century Over?,  and  Will the United States Learn from the Iraq War, vol. 2, Surge and Withdrawal, 2007–2011 by Naval War College, The U.S.
Naval War College Review 
Volume 73 
Number 1 Winter 2020 Article 9 
2020 
Review Essays: "Bringing Domestic Politics Back into Grand 
Strategy," "Is the American Century Over?," and "Will the United 
States Learn from the Iraq War, vol. 2, Surge and Withdrawal, 
2007–2011" 
The U.S. Naval War College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review 
Recommended Citation 
Naval War College, The U.S. (2020) "Review Essays: "Bringing Domestic Politics Back into Grand Strategy," 
"Is the American Century Over?," and "Will the United States Learn from the Iraq War, vol. 2, Surge and 
Withdrawal, 2007–2011"," Naval War College Review: Vol. 73 : No. 1 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/9 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval 
War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu. 
REVIEW ESSAYS
bringing domestic politics back into grand strategy
Michael O’Hara
American Pendulum: Recurring Debates in U.S. Grand Strategy, 
by Christopher Hemmer� Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ� Press, 
2015� 224 pages� $29�95�
Is the American Century Over?, by Joseph S� Nye Jr� Malden, 
MA: Polity, 2015� 146 pages� $12�95�
Having to answer such questions as how to maintain primacy and how to wield 
such power illustrates the luxury of exercising hegemony and the challenge of 
being a superpower� But it was not always thus for the United States� In the late 
nineteenth century, as the country rose and began to surpass Great Britain, the 
Naval War College’s own Alfred Thayer Mahan advocated a powerful vision of 
American growth by looking outward� Mahan’s grand strategy was inherently 
maritime, and he proposed an “expansion of national influences” through not 
only military means but also commercial trade and other tools of statecraft� To 
Mahan, American grand strategy required deep engagement in the world�
Of course, Mahan was not the first to preach this gospel� Decades earlier, 
John Quincy Adams had guided the fledgling state in feeling out the extent and 
limits of American power� Many European states viewed jealously the endow-
ment of resources and demography of the United 
States� Foreign powers understood immediately 
the potential for American power—and the need 
to check it before its inevitable rise� According to 
historian and former Naval War College profes-
sor Charles Edel, Adams recognized the hostility 
of the continental powers, and he understood his 
“special duty” to pursue peace� Intent on securing 
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America’s rise, Adams conceived of a grand strategy to guide his nation toward 
power and, more importantly, toward justice�
Two recent works by Christopher Hemmer and Joseph Nye examine the 
challenges of acquiring power and holding on to it� Hemmer and Nye address 
the problems of American statecraft through the twentieth century until the 
Obama era� Today, as the presidential campaign season begins and we continue 
the perpetual debate over America’s role in the world, these books are timely and 
relevant� The analyses from these two scholars, one a dean of the U�S� Air War 
College and the other a former dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, indicate that American preeminence will extend far into the twenty-first 
century� However, the character of that power may look very different and will 
require the United States to make smart strategic choices at home and abroad�
At its outset, Christopher Hemmer’s American Pendulum: Recurring Debates 
in U.S. Grand Strategy asks, “Should a state invest more in its armed forces, its 
health-care system, the education of its young, its economic infrastructure, or 
its diplomatic apparatus?” (p� 4)� For many, the answer to this question depends 
not only on how the state conceives of power but on whether one accepts the 
author’s definition of grand strategy� Hemmer frames his analysis using Barry 
Posen’s theory of security: that it is “national, comprehensive, and long term” 
and “advanc[es] some conception of a state’s national interests as a whole” (p� 2)� 
This broader definition puts Hemmer into the conversation with other scholars 
such as Hal Brands, John Gaddis, Paul Kennedy, Christopher Layne, and John 
Mearsheimer� If Hemmer casts grand strategy as a guns-or-butter problem, Nye 
offers a sensible solution: both�
Hemmer’s chapters detail eight episodes in the last century� Beginning with 
the American rise to power under Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, 
Hemmer discusses the expanding security perimeter of the United States� He 
looks beyond the Monroe Doctrine to the dilemma facing a nation with increas-
ing means and ambitions� For readers with an interest in the policy of contain-
ment, Hemmer discusses its origins, implementation, extensions, and culmina-
tion over the four central chapters of the book� Here readers will enjoy a rich 
discussion of the Truman Doctrine, the competing visions of George Kennan and 
Paul Nitze, détente, and the “end of history�” The chapters provide ample citations 
to a breadth of scholarship� For those who argue that strategy requires an adver-
sary, Hemmer’s chapter titled “Grand Strategy in the Absence of a Clear Threat” 
examines the shift from containment to “enlargement” and the challenges that 
faced decision makers during the period to which Charles Krauthammer referred 
as “the unipolar moment”—from the fall of the Soviet Union until 9/11� The war 
on terror and the rise of China receive treatments in the final two chapters�
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Hemmer frames the recurring debate in American grand strategy as the chal-
lenge of striking the right balance between unilateralism and multilateralism� 
From the Farewell Address of George Washington, who advocated for “as little 
political connection as possible” in commercial relations, to Thomas Jefferson’s 
warning about the dangers of “entangling alliances,” the American tradition is re-
plete with skepticism about foreign engagement� The crucial debate for Hemmer, 
however, is “not about whether to be internationally involved, but about how to 
be internationally involved” (p� 7)� Therefore the question Hemmer poses is not 
about American isolationism, but rather about how—and on what terms—the 
United States should engage in the world�
In Is the American Century Over?, Joseph S� Nye Jr� argues that multilateral 
engagement in the world was an essential element of the “American Century” 
and a fundamental feature of American power� The book’s title begs the question 
in a period of increased American unilateralism� Nye frames American power in 
terms not only of the sticks and carrots of hard power but of the attraction and 
persuasion of soft power—the latter being a term he coined� For Nye, America 
was at the height of its power when it led the club of nations that enjoyed unprec-
edented security and prosperity�
Whereas Hemmer focuses on American power in terms of the country’s eco-
nomic and military might that came to the fore at the turn of the last century, Nye 
argues that the American Century began in 1941 as the United States assumed 
the central role in maintaining a global balance of power� Nye’s analysis proceeds 
from this foundational question about the start date of the American Century to 
ask whether the United States is in decline, in either absolute or relative terms� 
Ultimately, Nye concludes that the United States has passed its peak; neverthe-
less, he argues that the United States will remain the most powerful nation in the 
world� America will maintain its preponderance of power, but in less dominant 
proportions� Thus, even amid concerns about the rise of China and the supposed 
danger of Graham Allison’s “Thucydides trap,” Nye remains optimistic�
Yet immediately after his consideration of hegemonic transition and America’s 
responses to this challenge, Nye curbs his enthusiasm about American power by 
considering the problem of strategic overstretch� A concise examination of the 
culture, society, economy, and political institutions of Rome provides a brief but 
sobering lesson� In this analogy, Nye concludes that the key to America sustain-
ing its strength lies in its political unity, a renewal through immigration and 
entrepreneurial innovation, and its political institutions� Whereas many strate-
gists look beyond their borders for answers to American security within the 
international system, Nye focuses on internal factors as the means to maintain 
our place in the world�
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Domestic politics, it turns out, is key to grand strategy both for Nye and for 
Hemmer—just as it was for the great Cold War strategist George Kennan� To the 
author of the containment strategy, domestic vitality was the key to successful 
foreign engagement� In his 1947 “long telegram,” Kennan urged the United States 
to “create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country 
which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of 
its internal life and with the responsibilities of a world power, and which has a 
spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents 
of the time�”1 For the grand strategist, whose concern is to leverage the elements 
of national power to attain a political aim, both Hemmer and Nye might agree 
with Kennan that the theory of American security begins and ends—as it did 
during the competition with the Soviet Union—with “a nation dependent on 
pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and po-
litical leadership that history plainly intended them to bear�”2 Hemmer and Nye 
complement each other well, and they remind us that the most important recur-
ring discussions about grand strategy begin at home—wise words too often left 
out of the debate on statecraft�
N O T E S
 1� X [George F� Kennan], “Sources of Soviet 
Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947), p� 867�
 2� Ibid�, p� 868�
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will the united states learn from the iraq war? 
Daniel J. Cormier
The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, ed� Joel D� Rayburn [Col�, 
USA] and Frank K� Sobchak [Col�, USA]� Vol� 2, Surge and 
Withdrawal, 2007–2011. Carlisle, PA: U�S� Army War College 
Press, 2019�
The U�S� Army’s unofficial two-volume history of the Iraq War offers a critical 
examination of the conflict, one that is illuminating and controversial� In 2013, 
while serving as the U�S� Army’s Chief of Staff, General Raymond T� Odierno 
commissioned a team of Army warrior-scholars, all of whom had served in Iraq 
during the war, and asked them to conduct a candid examination of the conflict� 
He wanted to ensure that the Army and the nation grasped the war’s implications 
for the future� The study accomplishes this goal� It escapes the pattern of most 
official histories by openly addressing contentious topics� It is an engaging read 
that includes critiques of the decisions of senior military and civilian leaders as 
well as instructive lessons from the conflict�
But critics of the study are also accurate in pointing out that the work is not 
definitive� The complexity, scope, and duration of the conflict will foster a va-
riety of interpretations� In the foreword, another Army former Chief of Staff, 
General Mark Milley, highlights this reality� He describes the history as an 
“interim” report that is intended to “sharpen thinking, and promote debate�” 
That description is accurate, and it underscores the study’s value� This history 
shines a light on the need for a national dialogue about how the United States 
understands, prepares for, and conducts war�
These goals challenge many of the current efforts in Washington to move on 
from the conflict and focus on the business of great-power competition� This 
desire, the authors correctly point out, epitomizes the type of conceptual failure 
that happened after Vietnam� It allowed the wrong “lessons of Vietnam” to take 
hold, leading the Army and the nation to over-
value technology and to focus, almost exclusively, 
on high-end conflict� The emphasis on tactical ex-
cellence created military leaders who were ill pre-
pared for the complexities of modern war� It took 
several years for the United States to comprehend 
the fallacy of this outlook, as it had to relearn the 
same lessons in Iraq� That learning curve required 
a price that was paid in blood and treasure�
Dr. Daniel J. Cormier is a professor in the National 
Security Affairs Department at the Naval War Col-
lege. As an Army officer, he has served in a variety 
of command and staff assignments in the United 
States, Europe, the Middle East, and, most recently, 
Africa. In addition to his operational background, 
he is a Middle East Foreign Area Officer and gradu-
ate of the Moroccan Cours d’état-major, the French 
École de guerre, and the French Institut des hautes 
études de défense nationale.
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On the basis of a survey of recently declassified military records, as well as oral 
history interviews, the authors provide an unclassified account of how America’s 
senior military leaders in Iraq understood the conflict and reacted to the complex 
mosaic of challenges they faced� The second volume begins by summarizing the 
flawed decisions made by senior U�S� government leaders early in the war that 
were detailed in the first volume of the work� These included the proclamations 
that excluded Baath Party members from the new Iraqi government and disband-
ed the Iraqi army, as well as constraints that Washington placed on American 
troop levels� Those choices disenfranchised Iraq’s Sunni population and created 
a security vacuum� The former Iraqi soldiers and leaders became the backbone 
of insurgent movements that resisted efforts to establish a new government 
in Baghdad� The decisions also revealed an American strategy for the conflict 
that was overly ambitious� For example, the objectives for the war were poorly 
aligned with the resources provided� Additionally, the U�S� administration failed 
to sustain American public support or to create the international cooperation 
on which success depended� The administration never effectively responded to 
Syria’s direct support of Sunni insurgents and Iran’s sponsorship of Shia attacks 
on U�S� forces� This lack of a coherent regional strategy ceded the initiative early 
to “Syrian and Iranian proxies,” making the accomplishment of America’s “politi-
cal and military objectives almost impossible” (pp� 620–21)�
The study also makes clear that, from beginning to end, U�S� actions in Iraq 
suffered from naive assessments at the highest levels of the U�S� government� 
These included a “short-war assumption” and the superficial belief in the trans-
formative power of democratization, specifically elections (p� 619)� The authors 
detail how the parliamentary elections in 2005 chiefly served to empower a new 
Shia elite that was beholden to the interests of religious and tribal-based fac-
tions� This led Iraqi government officials to pursue efforts to control the nation’s 
security forces to dominate their Sunni rivals� A Kurdish push for semiautonomy 
for Iraq’s northern provinces further demonstrated the scramble for power that 
American decisions unleashed� Instead of rebuilding a new nation-state, the quick 
return of authority to the Iraqi government produced a new era of sectarian strife�
Additionally, the authors avoid re-creating the Vietnam myth that the U�S� 
military could have won but for the decisions of its civilian leaders� There was no 
dereliction of duty in Washington, DC, where national leaders simply pursued 
narrow interests over the advice of the military� In fact, the authors argue that sev-
eral of America’s military leaders supported the decisions made in Washington—
and thus helped lose the war (pp� 9–10)� The faithful adherence to policy guid-
ance by General George W� Casey, the U�S� Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) 
commander from 2003 to 2007, translated into a coalition strategy oriented 
toward quickly training and transferring responsibilities to indigenous forces in 
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Iraq� These choices squandered precious time and allowed the security situation 
to deteriorate (p� 618)� By 2006, Iraq effectively was divided along sectarian lines, 
jeopardizing its survival as a unitary state�
The preponderance of volume 2 details the efforts of American forces to 
reverse this severe situation, from 2007 until they withdrew in 2011� The au-
thors include a summary of the debates, critiques, and studies that took place in 
Washington, such as the congressionally appointed Iraq Study Group findings in 
2006 that included seventy-nine recommendations and emphasized the need for 
bipartisan cooperation in Washington, DC, unity of effort by U�S� government 
agencies in the Middle East, and enhanced diplomatic efforts with Syria and 
Iran to produce the support required to stabilize Iraq� Several of the perspec-
tives from academia and think tanks and from within the U�S� government are 
examined also� These include Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s support 
for a steady transfer of control from American to Iraqi forces (pp� 10–16)� But 
President George W� Bush decided on a different course� He replaced Rumsfeld 
with Robert M� Gates, overruled many of his principal military advisers, and 
agreed to a “surge” of U�S� troops that others proclaimed offered a chance for 
success (pp� 17–24)�
The study posits that the steps taken in Iraq after 2007 ushered in a new era 
of the war� General David Petraeus, who replaced Casey as the MNF-I com-
mander, and Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, the day-to-day commander 
of all coalition troops in Iraq, implemented several changes that transformed 
the security situation� For example, they ensured a more coherent U�S� whole-
of-government effort and repositioned military units from large bases to small 
outposts� These shifts permitted counterinsurgency (COIN) techniques that 
improved understanding of Iraq’s sociopolitical challenges� The authors also 
highlight that the new approach enhanced the integration of U�S� conventional 
and special forces efforts, leading to significant improvements in the security 
situation in Iraq�
The study’s positive portrayal of the effectiveness of COIN operations is bal-
anced by several sobering revelations� Chief among these is that the Iraqi prime 
minister, Nuri al-Maliki, never subscribed to the U�S� goal of reconciling with 
the disenfranchised populations of Iraq (p� 432)� While America fought battles 
to rebuild Iraq, al-Maliki postured for a sectarian confrontation and continued 
his well-established pattern of marginalizing the Sunni factions (pp� 472–76)� His 
unwillingness to embrace political compromise meant that the gains in security 
that the U�S� surge produced were temporary and indecisive�
By the end of 2008, as President Bush was preparing to leave office, the United 
States signed a strategic framework agreement with Iraq� The accord moved 
American forces out of Iraq’s cities in the summer of 2009 and included a pledge to 
7
Naval War College: Review Essays: "Bringing Domestic Politics Back into Grand Strate
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 1 5 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
withdraw them completely by 2011� These steps undermined any remaining U�S� 
influence in Iraq; U�S� forces found themselves watching from the sidelines in 2010 
as al-Maliki refused to relinquish power after a new round of parliamentary elec-
tions� The Iraqi prime minister also thwarted the final attempts of the United States 
to build a strategic relationship with Iraq through a status of forces agreement that 
would have allowed a residual American advisory presence� Instead, Iraq’s Shia-
dominated government developed a closer relationship with Tehran (pp� 414–20)� 
The report concludes that Iran was the “only victor” from the war (p� 639)� But 
global affairs are rarely resolved� In 2014, American troops returned to Iraq to help 
it fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria—a mission that continues today�
In the last chapter, the authors catalog several of the major insights that 
permeate the study� These include identifying the ways that the Army culture 
and bureaucracy detracted from the war’s efforts� For example, Rayburn and 
Sobchak reject the prevalent view in Washington that technology can replace the 
troop-intensive requirements of modern combat operations� They emphasize 
that human interaction remains indispensable to understanding and addressing 
the sociopolitical dynamics of any war (pp� 615–16)� Their study also contends 
that the U�S� government’s management of the war did not encourage American 
commanders to be innovative� The Washington culture and bureaucracy prefer 
compliance, centralize decision-making, and discourage risk taking� The au-
thors argue that the nation must escape this pattern, prevalent since Vietnam� 
Instead, military commanders must share responsibility for ensuring the quality 
of decision-making and strategy formulation� They also must be able and willing 
to adapt rapidly as conditions on the ground change (p� 621)�
Another major concern the study illuminates is that America’s senior com-
manders relied on “overly optimistic planning” and failed to reassess several 
assumptions adequately (p� 625)� Among these assumptions was a reliance on 
the metric of violent incidents, particularly against their own forces, to measure 
stability and progress in Iraq� Commanders repeatedly and erroneously judged 
that Iraq was more stable than it was and that a rapid transfer of power was 
possible (p� 619)� This confusion also was seen in Vietnam� Additionally, the na-
tion’s generals never were able to anchor military coalition efforts successfully to 
the political goals of the United States in Iraq� This gap in strategy occurred in 
part because of a failure to discern the sociopolitical dynamics of Iraq and the 
Middle East, such as the rivalries that existed in Iraq and their link to its national 
politics� Instead, the U�S� generals continually were surprised that Iraqis and re-
gional players were pursuing their own interests and remained focused “on the 
comfortable tactical and operational tasks that were necessary but not sufficient” 
to address Iraq’s challenges and accomplish American strategic objectives (pp� 
619–20, 625–26)�
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The authors also illuminate gaps between how U�S� leaders conceptualized 
the conflict and the war’s realities� They cite the failure to appreciate that a “sov-
ereignty dilemma” existed in Iraq, where gains in security led to a decline in 
American influence over government leaders in Baghdad, who became empow-
ered to consolidate their political positions� They argue that a “counterintuitive 
application of U�S� national power” often is needed, such as the requirement for 
increases in economic and diplomatic commitments as security improves or the 
withholding of American capabilities in the absence of political progress (p� 619)�
It is important to note that the Army’s narrative history is not the final word� 
The research for the study was limited primarily to American, allied, and recently 
unclassified sources� As more documents are released and additional perspec-
tives are assessed, such as Iraqi and Middle Eastern views, a different and more 
comprehensive picture of the Iraq War likely will emerge� The authors also could 
have engaged more thoroughly with several analytical inquiries� For example, 
their examination of the value of COIN operations is focused too narrowly 
against the presurge strategy inside Iraq and at the operational level of war� They 
also could have examined whether America’s COIN approaches were misaligned 
with the sociopolitical context of Iraq, such as privileging centralized Western 
conceptions of governance� Other pertinent factors that are worthy of consider-
ation include whether and how the undertow of global geopolitics, regional per-
ceptions that America’s actions were neocolonial, and the challenges presented by 
tribal culture affected America’s application of COIN concepts� These types of in-
vestigations may paint a different picture about the course and lessons of the war�
But this history of the Iraq War illuminates several problems that must be 
addressed if the United States is going to avoid repeating the same mistakes in 
future conflicts� For the military, there is a need for substantive changes in how 
leaders are prepared to serve at the strategic level� This includes reconsidering 
how the context of modern war affects the efficacy of military force and concep-
tions of success, as well as how hybrid warfare techniques and disruptive technol-
ogies—such as information, cyber, space, artificial intelligence, and robotics—
challenge traditional preparations for conflict and competition� Importantly, the 
military needs senior leaders who are capable of wrestling with this complexity 
and linking the use of martial means to the context of the environment, as well 
as the political ends desired� They also must serve as custodians of competent 
and responsible strategic thinking� The “best” military advice is irrelevant if it 
is not tied to achievable political objectives� These considerations could impel a 
profound change in how the Army and the nation develop the talent, technol-
ogy, and concepts of operations they will need to be successful in the future� But 
whether this study achieves its goal of producing the burst of introspection that 
Washington requires remains to be seen�
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